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1 Introduction
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [1] characterize four new rules for ranking sets in
a context of choice under complete uncertainty, where the elements of the sets
are interpreted as possible uncertain outcomes. One of them is called min-max
relation, other one is called max-min relation. The min-max relation compares
any pair of sets by considering ﬁrst the worst element (possible outcome) of each
set. If the worst element of one set is better than that of the other, then the
ﬁrst set is considered to be better. But in the case when both worst elements
are equal, unlike the standard maximin rule, the min-max criterion looks at the
best element in both sets. Then, if the best element in one set is better than that
of the other set, the ﬁrst set is declared to be better, and if the respective best
elements are equal, then both sets are considered to be indiﬀerent. The max-
min rule represents the dual case in relation with the min-max. According to
the max-min rule, the decision maker looks ﬁrst at the respective best possible
outcomes, and in case they are equal, then he considers the respective worst
ones.
As pointed out by the authors, these rules are plausible in contexts where the
decision maker tends to concentrate on certain “focal” or “conspicuous” features
of sets, for example their best and worst elements.
One of the axioms used for the characterization of both, the max-min rule
and min-max rule is called Independence (IND). This axiom requires that if a set
of possible outcomes A is strictly better than another set B, then, the addition
of a new element to both sets never reverses the previous ranking between A
and B. Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [1] prove that this axiom, together with some
others, are suﬃcient to assert that the only way to compare sets of outcomes is
the min-max criterion. Afterwards, in combination with other diﬀerent axioms,
IND is used again to reach logically the max-min criterion. The authors leave
the necessary part of the proof to the reader in the case of both rules. However,
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when we check whether or not they satisfy the axioms, both, the min-max and
the max-min rule, violate IND.
This fact constitutes the main motivation for this Note. Section 2 presents
the basic notation and axioms used in [1], as well as a counterexample showing
that neither the max-min nor the min-max rule satisfy IND; also three new
axioms are proposed. In Section 3 an alternative way to characterize both rules
is proposed. This alternative proposal has been made trying to maintain as far as
possible the original axioms of Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu [1]. Section 4 contains
a brief description of another alternative way to reach, with diﬀerent axioms,
the same results.
2 The Basic Notation and Axioms
Throughout this work we will basically follow the original notation used by
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu in [1]. However, for the reader’s convenience we will
restate below the notation to be used.
Let X denote the non-empty and ﬁnite universal set of alternatives. Let K
denote the set of all non-empty subsets ofX. An element ofK is interpreted as an
uncertain prospect where the agent does not know the probability distribution,
nor any likelihood ranking of the possible outcomes. K2 denotes the class {A ∈
K s.t. #A ≤ 2}.
R will denote a given linear preference ordering over X, that is, a reﬂexive,
transitive, complete and antisymmetric binary relation. P represents the asym-
metric factor of R. For all A∈K a, a denote, respectively, the worst and best
elements of A according to R, while for all A,B∈K, min(A∪B) andmax(A∪B)
denote, respectively, the worst and best elements of (A∪B) according to R. Note
that the worst and best elements are both well-deﬁned and unique for all A∈K
because X is ﬁnite and R is a linear ordering.
Let  be an ordering over K, that is,  is a reﬂexive, transitive, and com-
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plete binary relation over the possible sets of outcomes, which represents the
decision maker’s preference ordering over the possible uncertain prospects. 
and ∼ denote, respectively, the asymmetric and the symmetric factors of .
The min-max relation (denoted by mnx) and the max-min relation (denoted
by mxn) are respectively deﬁned by:
For all A,B∈K, A mnx B: ⇔ [(aP b) or ((aIb) and (aRb)].
For all A,B∈K, A mxn B :⇔ [(aP b) or((aIb) and (aRb)].
In a ﬁrst result, Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu prove that the two following
axioms are suﬃcient (but not necessary) to assert that, for all A∈K, A ∼ {a, a}
(see Theorem 1 in [1, pg.299]):
Simple Monotonicity (SM): for all x, y∈X such that xPy, {x}  {x, y}  {y}.
Independence (IND): for all A,B∈K and all x∈X\(A ∪ B), A  B implies
A ∪ {x}  B ∪ {x}
Afterwards, Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu present the following four additional
axioms in order to characterize the min-max and the max-min rule,
Type 1 Simple Dominance (SD1): for all x, y, z∈X such that xPyPz, {x, z} 
{y, z}.
Type 2 Simple Dominance (SD2): for all x, y, z∈X such that xPyPz, {x, y} 
{x, z}.
Simple Uncertainty Aversion (SUA): for all x, y, z∈X such that xPyPz,
{y}  {x, z}.
Simple Uncertainty Appeal (SUP): for all x, y, z∈X such that xPyPz, {x, z} 
{y}.
By means of the previous axioms Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu prove the fol-
lowing result (see Lemma 2 in [1, pg.303]):
 satisfies SM, SD1 and SUA iff for allA, B∈K2, A  B ⇔ A mnx B.
(1)
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 satisfies SM, SD2 and SUP iff for all A, B∈K2, A  B ⇔ A mxn B.
(2)
Finally, by using (1), (2) and their Theorem 1, they propose the following
Theorem (Theorem 3 in the original version, see [1, pg.304]):
 satisfies SM, IND, SD1 and SUA if and only if =mnx (3)
 satisfies SM, IND, SD2 and SUP if and only if =mxn (4)
However, neither mnx nor mxn satisfy axiom IND. Let us consider the
following counterexamples:
Let X = {a, b, c, d, e} such that aP bP cPdPe. Then {b, c} mnx {a, d} but
{a, d, e} mnx {b, c, e}
On the other hand, {b, e} mxn {c, d} but {a, c, d} mxn {a, b, e}
This lack, as well as the plausability of both rules, motivates this Note in
order to axiomatically characterize them. The following results try to ﬁll this gap
reasonably maintaining an important part of the axiomatic structure proposed
originally by the authors in [1]. For that, three new axioms will be introduced:
Substitution (SUB): for all A∈K, for all y∈A and x∈X\A, xPy implies
(A ∪ {x})\{y}  A.
Monotone Consistency (MC): for all A,B∈K, A  B implies A ∪B  B
Robustness (ROB) for all A,B, C∈K, A  B and A  C implies A  B ∪C.
SUB simply states that replacing in any set of outcomes, one of them by
another one which is better, leads to a prospect which is weakly prefered. Note
that SUB does not imply axioms SD1 or SD2 because SD1 and SD2 deal with
strict preferences. On the other hand, SD1 and/or SD2 neither imply SUB as
long as SD1 and SD2 involve simple situations where only two possible outcomes
are possible.
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MC ensures that if an uncertain prospect A is weakly better than another
prospect B, then the worst one cannot be strictly better than the union of both.
The intuition behind MC is the following: after adding the possible outcomes
in A to those in the worse prospect B, the decision maker maintains the same
outcomes he had in B plus those in A which made him evaluate A as preferred
to B. Therefore the new situation should not be strictly worse than in the case
of having only B.
ROB establishes that if an uncertain prospect A is weakly better than a pair
of prospects B and C, then the union of B and C cannot be strictly better than
prospect A. ROB is closely related to an axiom called Union by Pattanaik and
Peleg [2], also in a context of choice under complete uncertainty. According to
Pattanaik and Peleg’s axiom, if a singleton set {a} is better than a pair of sets
B and C, it is so in relation with the union of B and C. ROB is reasonable
in a context of choice under complete uncertainty as far as the possible worse
outcomes in B and in C which made the decision maker prefer the uncertain
prospect A to both of them, remain after the union of B and C. Therefore that
union should not be strictly better than prospect A, even if now B ∪C contains
more possible outcomes.
3 An Alternative characterization of the max-min and
the min-max rules
We are now ready to propose the following results:
Theorem 1 (In substitution of Theorem 1 in [1, pg.299])
If  satisfies SUB, MC and ROB, then, for all A∈K, A ∼ {a, a} (5)
Proof. Let A∈K and let A = {a1, a2, . . . , an} denote the set A ordered according
to P (a1Pa2P . . . P an). If n ≤ 2 the proof is trivial. If n > 2, by reﬂexivity
{a1, an}  {a1, an}. By SUB {a1, an}  {a2, an}. Therefore by ROB {a1, an} 
7
{a1, a2, an}. If n > 3, we apply again SUB to get {a1, an}  {a3, an}, and as
{a1, an}  {a1, a2, an}, again by ROB {a1, an}  {a1, a2, a3, an}. Repeating as
often as necessary we reach {a, a}  A.
On the other hand, by SUB {a1, an−1}  {a1, an}. By MC that implies
{a1, an−1, an}  {a1, an}. If n > 3 we apply again SUB to get {a1, an−2, an} 
{a1, an−1, an}. By MC {a1, an−2, an−1, an}  {a1, an−1, an}, and by transitivity
{a1, an−2, an−1, an}  {a1, an}. Repeating as often as necessary we reach A 
{a, a}, which together with {a, a}  A implies {a, a} ∼ A. 
unionsq
Independence of the axioms: Let X = {x, y, z} and xPyPz.
– Let {z}  {y, z}  {x, z} ∼ {x, y, z}  {y}  {x, y}  {x}. Then  satisﬁes
ROB and MC, but not SUB.
– Let {x}  {x, y}  {y}  {x, y, z}  {x, z}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
SUB and MC, but not ROB (note that {x, z} ∼ {x, z} and {x, z}  {y, z}
but {x, y, z}  {x, z}).
– Let {x}  {x, y}  {y}  {x, z}  {x, y, z}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
SUB and ROB, but not MC ({x, y}  {x, z} but {x, z}  {x, y, z}).
Theorem 2 (In substitution of Theorem 3 in [1, pg.304])
 satisfies SM, ROB, MC, SD1 and SUA if and only if =mnx (6)
 satisfies SM, ROB, MC, SD2 and SUP if and only if =mxn (7)
Note that in relation with the original Theorem 3 in [1], axiom IND is sub-
stituted by axioms ROB and MC, while the remaining axioms are the same.
Proof. : We will ﬁrst show thatmnx satisﬁes ROB andMC (it is straightforward
to show that it satisﬁes SM, SD1 and SUA)
– ROB: for all A,B, C∈K, A mnx B and A mnx C implies one of the four
following possibilites.
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1. aP b and aP c. In this case aPmin(B ∪ C). Therefore A mnx B ∪ C
2. a = b = c and aRb, c. In this case a = min(B ∪ C) and aRmax(B ∪C).
Therefore A mnx B ∪ C
3. a = bP c and aRb. Then min(B ∪ C) = c. Therefore A mnx B ∪ C.
4. a = cP b and aRc, which is analogous to the previous case.
– MC: for all A,B∈K, A mnx B implies (aP b) or [(a = b) and (aRb).
Therefore min(A ∪B)Rb and max(A∪B)Rb, which implies A ∪B mnx B
It is also straightforward to show that mxn satisﬁes SM, SD2 and SUP, and
in order to prove that it also satisﬁes ROB and MC we would follow analogous
steps as followed in the proof for mnx.
Now, the converse part of the implications should be proved. That is, we shall
start proving that if  satisﬁes SM, ROB, MC, SD1 and SUA, then =mnx .
Step 1. As a ﬁrst step we will prove that if  satisﬁes SM and SUA, then it
satisﬁes SD2: Let x, y, z∈X, xPyPz. By SUA {y}  {x, z}, and by SM {x, y} 
{y}. Then, by transitivity {x, y}  {x, z}.
Step 2. Secondly, we will prove that if  satisﬁes SM, ROB, MC, SD1 and
SUA, then, for all A∈K, s.t. #A ≤ 3, A ∼ {a, a}. Let A∈K, #A = n, n ≤ 3.
If n ≤ 2 the proof is trivial.
If n = 3, let A = {a1, a2, a3} denote the set A ordered according to R
(a1Pa2Pa3). By SD2 {a1, a2}  {a1, a3}. By MC {a1, a2, a3}  {a1, a3}. On the
other hand, by reﬂexivity {a1, a3}  {a1, a3} and by SD1 {a1, a3}  {a2, a3}.
Applying ROB we get {a1, a3}  {a1, a2, a3}, which together with {a1, a2, a3} 
{a1, a3} implies {a1, a2, a3} ∼ {a1, a3}.
Step 3. For any m ∈ N s.t. m ≥ 3. If ∀B ∈ K s.t. #B = m, B ∼ {b, b}, then,
∀A ∈ K s.t. #A = m+ 1, A ∼ {a, a}.
For any A ∈ K s.t. #A = m + 1, let A = {a1, a2, . . . , am+1} such that
(a1Pa2P . . . am+1). By hypothesis A\{am+1} ∼ {a1, am} andA\{am} ∼ {a1, am+1}.
By SD2 {a1, am}  {a1, am+1}. Then, by transitivity,A\{am+1}  A\{am}, and
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by MC, A  A\{am}.
On the other hand, by hypothesis {a1, am+1} ∼ A\{am} ∼ A\{am−1}. By
reﬂexivity A\{am} ∼ A\{am}. Then, by ROB A\{am}  A, wich together with
A  A\{am} implies A ∼ A\{am}. By hypothesis A\{am} ∼ {a1, am+1}. Then,
by transitivity A ∼ {a1, am+1}
Step 4. ∀A ∈ K, A ∼ {a, a}.
If #A ≤ 3 we apply directly Step 2. If #A = l > 3, from Step 2, and applying
Step 3 (l− 3) successive times, we reach A ∼ {a, a}.
At this point, Step 4, together with (1) and transitivity of , prove directly
that SM, ROB, MC, SD1 and SUA imply =mnx.
To prove that SM, ROB, MC, SD2 and SUP imply =mxn we proceed
analogously: As a ﬁrst step it is easy to prove that SM and SUP implies SD1.
Therefore, we can obtain the same result of the previous Step 2 and apply it
together with (2) (where only axioms SM, SD2 and SUP are required).

unionsq
The following examples show that the axioms used respectively in (6) and in
(7) are independent. Let X = {x, y, z} and xPyPz.
Independence of SM, ROB, MC, SD1 and SUA:
– Let {x} ∼ {x, y}  {y}  {x, z} ∼ {x, y, z}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
ROB, MC, SD1 and SUA, but not SM.
– Let {x}  {x, y}  {y}  {x, y, z} ∼ {x, z} ∼ {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
SM, ROB, MC and SUA, but not SD1.
– mxn satisﬁes SM, ROB, MC, and SD1, but not SUA.
– For the independence of ROB and MC see the corresponding examples after
the proof of this Note’s Theorem 1.
Independence of SM, ROB, MC, SD2 and SUP:
– Let {x} ∼ {x, y}  {x, z} ∼ {x, y, z}  {y}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
ROB, MC, SD2 and SUP, but not SM.
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– Let {x}  {x, y}  {x, y, z}  {x, z}  {y}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
SM, MC, SD2 and SUP, but not ROB.
– Let {x}  {x, y}  {x, z}  {y}  {x, y, z}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
SM, ROB, SD2 and SUP, but not MC.
– Let {x}  {x, y} ∼ {x, z} ∼ {x, y, z}  {y}  {y, z}  {z}. Then  satisﬁes
SM, ROB, MC and SUP, but not SD2.
– mnx satisﬁes SM, ROB, MC, and SD2, but not SUP.
4 Final Remark
We could perfectly keep Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu’s Theorem 1 as they propose;
that is, using axioms SM and IND. (Note that, although IND is not satisﬁed by
the max-min and the min-max rule, their Theorem 1 is totally correct). On the
other hand, we could characterize the max-min and the min-max rule as made
in the previous section of this Note; that is, by means of axioms SM, ROB, MC
plus SD1 and SUA in the case of the min-max, and plus SD2 and SUP in the
case of the max-min.
This alternative leads to a slighter modiﬁcation of the original work by
Bossert, Pattanaik and Xu, and would be more justiﬁable if we conceive Theorem
1 on the one hand, and the characterization of the min-max and the max-min
on the other hand, as separate results. However, if we want to preserve a certain
axiomatic coherence between both Theorems, the modiﬁcations proposed in the
previous section seem to be the more plausible.
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